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RESTRICTED 
"POLICY" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Henry M. Wriston-
at the Naval War College 
May 23, 1950 
Occasionally it is desirable to take the mind off the instant 
problem · in order. to consider broader and more general questions ; 
the current puzzle is sometimes easier to solve after it is looked at 
in a longer perspective. When this is done successfully it changes 
the scale of daily events and makes it possible to view them with 
more detachment and see them in their relationship to values which 
are permanent. 
In an attempt to do something of that kind I wish to discuss 
what we really mean by "policy" in foreign affairs. At the outset 
we are faced with a problem in semantics. The language of 
diplomacy, at least until the Russians revised international manners, 
has been formal in style and notable for understatement. It is not 
infrequently equivocal in expression. The reason. is simple: anyone 
executing diplomatic maneuvers must have in mind the possibility 
of failure and must prepare in advance a way of retreat in order to 
save face; if prestige is maintained, it is possible to return to the 
encounter when arguments have been refurbished, military and 
other dispositions re-arranged, and when the chances of success are 
· more favorable.
In dealing with basic policy, however, "diplomatic" language 
should never be used. Meaning should be crystal clear; therefore, 
policy is best expressed in naked terms. An illustration from domes­
tic life will clarify the point. When nullification threatened the 
A prominent educator, historian and author, Dr. Wriston is now serving 
as president of Brown University in Providence, R. I. 
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Union, President Jackson reduced fundamental policy to a brief 
phrase in his classic toast: "The Federal Union:. it must be pre­
served.'' That was a definition of the problem in terms so clear, so 
explicit, and so simple that it was impossible to· confuse the issue. 
When adjustment, which had been tried earlier in the Mis­
souri Compromise and was tried again in 1850, failed to resolve the 
conflict and the States were brought to the verge of war, Lincoln re­
stated the Jacksonian policy in language equally clear and perhaps 
even more explicit. In a letter to Horace Greeley he wrote: "If I 
could save the Union withoutJreeing any slaves, I would do it; and 
if I could do it by freeing all the slaves!, I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also 
do that." 
He succeeded, in those few words, in separating the central 
issue-the preservation of the Union__:from the confusing emotional 
tensions arising frotn the problem of slavery. . In the Second In­
augural he again re-stated the issue with such matchless clarity that 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father, our Minister in Lon­
don: "That rail-splitting lawyer is one of the wonders of the day . .. 
This inaugural strikes me in the grand simplicity and directness as 
being for all time the historical keynote of this war." 
It is one of the major tragedies of our time that no such lucid 
summary of the meaning of the recent world war has come from 
any statesman. It is a measure of our confusion that it is asserted 
from time to time that no such valid and clear pronouncement could 
be made because of the incoherence which the Russian alliance· 
brought in its train. This is not true. If one has any grasp of 
historical fact, it must be clear that the Russian -alliance brought no 
more complications than the slavery issue brought to the War be­
tween the States. Lincoln was able to put in words which a child 
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could understand the reason for war. In similar fashion the basic 
policy beneath American participation in both world wars of the 
20th century is just as simple; any schoolboy could grasp it. It is, 
explicitly, that the interests of the United States are so world-wide 
that it could n0t permit any aggressor nation to control the whole 
continent of Europe-or for that matter Asia. 
That is the complete and adequate explanation of our par­
ticipation in both wars. It is also the complete and adequate ex-
planation of our delay in entering both wars. Our basic interest is 
real and vital, but it is neither so immediate nor so vital as the like 
interests of Britain and France. As long as there was reasonable 
basis for the belief that Britain and France could win alone, or with 
moral and material help from us, or assistance short of force, there 
was adequate reason to al;>stain from fighting: When it became 
clear that the risk of their defeat was too great and, therefore, 
our own policy was genuinely imperiled, we went in. It is not nec­
essary to assert that the timing was accurate in either case. The 
point is that delay in participation was� not irrational. As funda­
mental policy explains our entrance into the world wars, it equally 
explains our part in the "cold war"; the fact that victory in two 
world wars did not avoid the cold war does not invalidate the 
reasoning. 
When one looks at foreign policies, therefore, there are 
many which can be put in phrases just as clear and just as brief· 
as the Jacksonian policy with reference to the Federal Union. The 
classical British doctrine, the Balance of Power, illustrates the 
point. Our twin policies of the Open Door in China and the in­
tegrity of China are other illustrations. If one reflects upon those 
fundamentals with which we are concerned this morning, it will be 
perfectly obvious that they can be more effectively implemented 
and more successfully carried out when they are reduced to plain, 
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naval war with France and the War of 1812 with Britain. But it 
could not emerge as a very significant policy until all the world 
recognized us as a. world power, and it could not become a funda­
mental policy until we were recognized as the Western power­
the anchor man in that power group. 
We have the- same sort of fundamental policy with regard 
to Asia. Of course, we had no basic Asiatic policy for many years 
because we did not face the Pacific and Asia was not a factor in 
world affairs., But once we touched the Pacific it is extraordinary 
how speedily men who have no claims to great statesmanship per­
ceived the reality of our interest in that continent. Thus as Asia 
came into the focus · of international aff'airs and as we rose to the 
stature of a world power, the policy of no single dominant power 
in Europe had to be matched by a policy of no dominant power in 
Asia. It found expression in two classical phrases-the Open Door 
in China, that is resistance to economic imperialism, and the In­
tegrity of China, or resistance to political imperialism. 
It is essential to recognize the extraordinary stability of 
basic policy. The ebb and flow of circumstances over those un­
derlying realities must occasion many tactical maneuvers in the 
effort to make policy effective, but that does not mean a new policy. 
The Integrity of China, for example, is still valid. It has suffered 
many vicissitudes. As a policy it was never fully achieved; but, if 
one understands its fundamental character and appreciates how long 
it was in maturing, it becomes · equally clear that it is not yet com­
pletely, or permanently, defeated. Its current eclipse is nothing to 
be happy about, but neither is it anything to despair over. 
Thus when we draw policy into its time perspective it be­
comes clear that most so-called "new'' policies are transient; that 
is because they violate a third quality which a fundamental policy 
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should have. It should be not only clear and stable, but free of 
passion and emotion; it ought to be a strictly intellectual construct 
framed from real and permanent interests and utterly devoid of 
heat. Of course, once it has come to definition and its status is 
determined it may be, in fact it must be, def ended with fervor. But 
what Jackson showed in his toast and Lincoln demonstrated in the 
War between the states, Washington had defined in his Farewell 
Address; he emphasized the objectivity of proper policy when he . 
spoke against "passionate attachments" and "inveterate an­
tipathies." 
Thus the so-:ealled "Morgenthau policy" for Germany was, 
it seems to me, not a policy at all; it was just a reaction under · 
emotional stress; it overlooked geography, mcperience, tlie talents 
of a people, strategical concepts, and the psychology of both Ger­
mans and Americans. It was, therefore, transient. 
It was also disastrous, because it exemplified a characteris­
tic modern error-.:the belief that the opposite of som�thing bad __ 
must be somethng good, which is not true. By destroying not only 
German dominance but German power completely, protection is not 
achieved; it may lead, as the Morgenthau proposal did, to a power 
vacuum and thus draw in another nation (in this instance Russia) 
until it tl}reatens to replace the beaten nation as the dominant force 
in Europe. The consequence may be a situation no less intolerable 
than that which was overcome by war. 
The policy of destroying all German power-economic, pol­
itical, and military-was emotionally oriented. The war checked 
Fascis� and Nazism, but the exhaustion of .the West offered to 
Russia an opportunity to attempt something which was contrary 
to our interest. Only slowly did realization dawn that an emotional 
response was likely to def eat our own policy by making us think 
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of Germany in negative terms only and misconceive Russia in posi­
tive terms, often sentimentally. This attitude can be summed up 
in the phrase, "Good old Joe," now happily relegated to the realm 
of myth. 
In the fourth place we should remember that the word 
"policy" should be reserved for the things which are fundamental 
and continuous and should not be applied to devices and tactics, 
however important they may be. -- It is a mistake, for example, to 
refer to the Marshall Plan as basic policy. It is an extraordinary 
important operation, but nonetheless essentially a tactical device 
in support of our basic policy of preventing a single aggressive power 
from encompassing Europe. It is, therefore, a means to a larger 
end. It is, as we know, a transient means, for, by its own terms, 
it is to end in 1952. It has all the elements of ingeniousness that 
any brilliant tactical maneuver should have; it involves the con­
structive use of economic power to buy time for the re-creation and 
re-organization of forces likely to hold Russia in check. Its success 
or failure must be judged upon those considerations. 
It certainly has bought time. I do not think anyone seri­
ously believes that the Italian Government would be constituted 
as it is today without the Marshall Plan or that the Greek Govern­
ment would be constituted as it is today but for Marshall aid. There 
is now before us a novel and bold suggestion-the Schuman pro­
posal for the integration of the coal and steel industries of France 
and Germany. That proposal would have been incredible if either 
DeGaulle or the Communists had been in contro.l of France. If the 
Third Force had not been perpetuated in power by external support, 
that dramatic program for strengthening the economic defenses of 
Western Europe would never have been proposed. 
Whether progress toward the re-organization of Europe is 
complete enough or swift enough is a matter of judgment. Current 
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spicuous by its absence in China. We, therefore, had no channel 
through which our policy could flow. General Wedmeyer also came 
to that conclusion and said, in effect, that if we wanted to be sure 
to stop the Reds we must supply the personnel and make the full 
commitments; otherwise we must let nature take its course for a 
time because he saw no hope of making an effective instrument of 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
Somewhat the same problem has confronted us in Greece; 
we have had to work with what is there. The letter, which Am­
bassador Grady wrote to the Premier of Greece on the first of 
April, makes it clear that what we have had to work with in that 
country is. not very good; he made a bold and tactically dangerous 
move to. improve it. This is what he said: "The effort to make 
Greece self-sustaining and independent of foreign aid .... has 
hardly begun . . . . An important reason for the · delay has been a 
less than satisfactory performance by the Greek Government in its 
conduct of economic affairs. Only twenty-seven months remain in 
which the Greek Government may take advantage of the American 
aid made available through the Marshall Plan. This short time 
permits no further delay . . . . The American people, however, are 
entitled to expect, and do expect, that any Greek Government 
which hopes to continue to receive the aid which they have gen­
erously offered, will utilize this assistance to the fullest degree. 
"In my opinion, only a stable and efficient Government SUP­
ported by the people and by Parliament will be able to act with 
courage and the firmness of long-term policy which are essential 
to the wise use of the aid offered by the American people. Irre­
sponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections before 
th.e new Parliament has had an opportunity to rise to its responsi­
bility, can only create a climate of political and economic uncer­
tainty which may do grave damage to the country's future .... 
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Only a Government which can secure and . maintain public confi­
dence by its boldness and by its devotion to the public interest can 
be expected to execute the reconstruction stage of Greek recovery. 
We earnestly hope the Greek Government will meet this challenge 
. . . . It is in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek 
Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to re­
ceive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which 
will attain its purpose. It is .the obligation and intention of the 
American Government with regard to all Marshall aid countries to 
decide whether or not the performance of the recipient Govern­
ment, whether Greek or any/ other, justifies a continuance of the 
aid on the scale heretofore contemplated." 
When one has read the letter and realizes that it is usually 
bad tactics to interfere so openly in · the domestic politics of a· 
foreign nation, both the boldness and the dangerousnes,s of the 
mo've become clear. It suggests the situation was so serious that 
only a drastic remedy was worth trying. It also highlights how a 
sound· and necessary policy may fail temporarily ( and the word · 
"temporarily" must sometimes be given a very flexible interpre­
tation) for want of adequate, cooperating partners. 
The sixth aspect of basic policy in this review is that suc­
cess or failure at any given moment is affected by the quality of 
our own management. Americans in times past were proud of our 
"shirt-sleeves diplomacy," which in some circumstances was well 
adapted and worked satisfactorily, and in other circumstances was 
hopelessly bad. There have been at times amazing deftness and 
finesse, great perception and skill, and at other times, stupidity 
and lack of stamina. 
As a sound strategic concept can fail for want of energy 
ari.d for many other reasons, so a policy which is entirely valid 
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can be under-played, as the Monroe Doctrine was from time to time 
when we were not alert enough in the defense of its principles; 
it can be over-played, also, as Olney did in the Venezuela case. 
Neither the under-playing nor the over-playing affects the valid­
ity of the basic concept. The Monroe Doctrine does not represent 
a geographic reality, for the Western Hemisphere, except physi­
cally, is pretty much a myth. Certainly it is not culturally valid. 
Nonetheless politically it is sound, and even the failure of Latin 
America to develop along the democratic lines that the Anglo­
Saxons believe are correct, while it causes difficulties, does not 
make the fundamental concept less valid. It must be said that so 
far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned our successive Secretaries 
of State, since we became a world power, have adapted themselves 
to the changing scene. 
In the seventh place, success of a basic policy does not hang 
upon dramatic or critical events. We have practically worn out 
the word "crisis" in our time. Modern means of communication 
and other factors have led us to over-dramatize the daily event 
and to hide the fact that indirect results are often more important 
than the immediate result. As George F. Kennan suggested recent­
ly in his notable speech in Milwaukee, sometimes five or ten years 
elapse between cause and effect in major foreign policy develop­
ments. The true meaning emerges only after the sense of crisis 
has subsided. 
Hitler offers a dramatic example: he told his men that on 
their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next 
thousand years." That was nonsense, because it made transient 
circumstances appear too decisive over too long a period. Already 
we can see that the German nation, though defeated, is now so 
essential to both competing power blocs that we may again see a 
repetition of what has happened so often before in history: over 
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a considerable period of time the defeated nation may profit more 
in defeat than it would have profited if it had won the victory. 
Hitler's error suggests a common failing. Right now over­
dramatization of current events leads us to expect too much of 
diplomatic conferences. It.is complained, for example, that the Big 
Three communique issued week before last sounded very much like . · 
the one issued nearly a year before. That ought not to be re­
garded as necessarily bad. It may well reflect steadiness of pur� 
pose, not a mere rushing from one hunch to another. 
/ 
In 1880 one of our basic policies was crystallized by Presi-
dent Hayes, when he said that, "The policy of this country is a 
canal under American control . . . . An inter-oceanic canal across 
·the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical re­
lations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United
States .... It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our· 
.... shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United 
States." 
The last phrase sums it UP-the canal as "part of the 
coast line of the United States." That was as explicit as a policy 
could be made. Few people could now tell with any precision why 
· that statement came just when ,it did; the crisis which precipitated
the pronouncement has faded. The policy, so plainly and forcefully
stated, remains. It ran counter to the terms of the Clayton.
Bulwer treaty and Hayes' comment was in a sense an announcement.
of the fact and a prediction that the treaty would not survi.ve. the
pursuit of American policy.
Over the years that policy could have been implemeJJted by 
any number of actions. At one extreme would have been the an­
nexation of everything within that "coast line." There was a 
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strong drift in that direction for some time. The statement of 
Olney that our "fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines 
its interposition" was in harmony with such an idea. The Platt 
Amendment. for Cuba and tlre putting of armed forces into Haiti, 
Santo Domtngo, Nicaragua, and other countries might have 
eventuated in military, political, and economic control. At the 
other extreme, while the basic policy of regarding the canal as 
part .of our coast line remains unchanged, · all our relations with 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have been.put upon the 
bases of mutuality, with some_ accent upon United States leader­
ship, to a degree which Olney's tactics would never have led one 
to expect as within the realm of possibility. In short, a shift in 
tactics from time to time seen in too short a perspective looks like 
a shift in policy, when in reality it does not involve 1:Juch a de­
velopment. 
This consideration leads to the eighth point. · One of the 
central i1:Jsues of recent discussion is bipartisanism. Basic policies 
are non-political. That is more accurate than saying bi-partisan. I 
think Senator· Vandenberg recently called- them "un-partisan," 
which correctly expresses the point. The Monroe Doctrine, the 
Panama Canal as our coast line, Canada as within our defense 
system resistance to. control of Europe or Asia by a single power­
all these policies would be the same whether the administration were 
Republican or Democratic. 
On the other hand, the tactical dispositions adopted to 
achieve the policies are subject to politics, and properly so. It is 
the essence of the democratic system that action by the party in 
power is carried on under the scrutiny and criticism of the.minority. 
In England this -is epitomized by the phrase, "His Majesty's loyal 
opposition." It is revealed in our government by the fraternaliza­
tion across the aisle at one moment and the tension· between the 
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two sides at the next. The opposition almost always has to take 
a somewhat negative attitude because it does not have access to all 
the current dispatches and information necessary for constructive 
judgment. But even when criticis� is negative, it may well force 
those in power to act carefully. It can be vigorous and occasionally 
may be violent, but should be at all costs responsible. When we 
see political opposition in this light, we realize that it is not to be 
deprecated, but encouraged; that is the only way in a democratic 
society by which the public can hear both sides of every question 
and reach a considered consensus. 
In times of crisis when there is imminent and serious 
danger, opposition is mitigated. That has been true of the so­
called "Truman Doctrine" with regard to Greece and Turkey, true in 
connection with the Berlin air lift and the Marshall Plan. N onthe­
less, if the mitigation of opposition is long continued and not 
limited to matters under dangerous tension, it leads to a tendency 
to regard all opposition as improper. That feeling is far more 
dangerous in many respects than even violent opposition because 
it cuts at the root of the responsibility of the majority party and 
- destroys the foundations for an informed public opinion.
Consideration of policy in these broader terms indicates in 
the ninth place that it must be judged dynamically, rather than by 
any static method of estimation. One recent proposal is that we 
draw up a balance sheet to show our assets and liabilities and learn 
whether or not we are over-extended. It is not ari apt analogy, 
because policy is never fully reflected in a balance sheet-even 
industrial policy. By its nature the momentum, which is inherent 
in the activity of -any organization, is not shown. In some of our 
greatest corporations, the balance sheet has an item: patents, one 
dollar. If the patents were really worth one dollar, the organization 
would be bankrupt. If the company did not have the patents, it 
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would not be in business. That dollar is merely a symbolic figure; 
it is an indication that the value of the patents cannot be esti­
mated. 
Anyone who has been on an investment committee knows 
that the balance sheet does not adequately reflect the kind of man­
agement the company has. The enterprise may be solvent, but 
stagnant; management may be vital, but unwise. Those consid­
erations could well be concealed, rather than revealed, on a balance 
sheet. Moreover, the balance sheet, by its very nature, isolates 
. the company. It does not show it in relationship to its competitors 
or to those cooperating with it. But an industrial company does 
not live in isolation any more than a nation does. Therefore, while 
a balance sheet has certain obvious merits, as a basis for estimation 
of policy it may be quite misleading. 
Let us take, for example, the Monroe Doctrine; on any bal­
ance-sheet theory it would never have been drafted by so stern a 
realist as John Quincy Adams nor uttered by so seasoned a political 
leader as James Monroe. There were timorous people who felt at 
the time that we were over-extending our commitments. They 
wanted us at least to concert our action with Britain; but John 
Quincy Adams, one of our really great Secretaries of State, said that 
he was unwilling the United States should come in �s "a cockboat 
in the wake of the British man-of-war." He could read with amuse­
ment, not untinged with irritation, the bombastic words of George 
Canning, "I called the New World into existence to redress the bal­
ance of the Old," because he knew that statement was not true. 
The policy involved in the Monroe Doctrine has been chal­
lenged many times and by many powers-Britain, France, and 
Germany among others-but we were seldom alone in its defense. 
It is not historically accurate to say that it rested upon the power 
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of the British navy. From time to time it did so depend to some 
extent, but at other times it challenged the power of the British 
navy. 
What the balance-sheet technique would conceal is that, when 
at various times the issue was drawn, there was almost always 
some nation with an interest which was parallel to our own over a 
short or middle-length period, and that we could count upon assist­
ance, direct or indirect. It was not even necessary that our inter­
ests should coincide with those of the cooperating power in Latin 
America; support might mean no more than a common desire to op­
pose the threatening power for wholly different reasons; the ef­
fect was to lend help to our policy at the moment of crisis. But 
even beyond such assistance there is a fact of first importance, 
namely that we always had a greater interest in the preservation of 
the Monroe Doctrine than anyone else could have in challenging it. 
This leads to the final characteristic of basic policy: not all 
policies, not even all basic policies, have the same order of magni­
tude or equal priority. We would defend the policy of the Panama 
Canal as part of our coast line before we would make war to avoid 
dominance of Asia by a single power. Similarly, we mitigated our 
support of the Monroe Doctrine in the course of the Civil War be­
cause the indissolubility of the Union took priority over the main­
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The balance-sheet technique con­
ceals the fact that our commitments are not uniform over the 
whole area of policy and, more particularly, that they are not uni­
form at any given moment. Moreover, not all the policies of a nation 
are challenged at the same moment. For this reason it is never 
necessary to exert all the nation's power behind every policy at one 
time ; they tend to be successively challenged-not all at once. 
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Other nations, some of whose policies parallel our own, may 
have, indeed must have, different priorities. That no one power 
should dominate Europe is American policy; it is also British 
policy and French policy. Inevitably it has a higher priority in the 
British and French hierarchy of policy than in ours. The same 
reasoning applies to aid to Greece and Turkey. Because they were 
on her life-line, Britain's interest was more immediate and direct 
than ours. Our interest in them was a subsidiary of our determina­
tion to let no nation dominate Europe. Only when Britain notified 
us that she could not bear the w�ight, and when the Russian threat 
was immediate and serious, did we take over the leadership. 
Today there is no direct threat to the Canal as part of our 
coast line, no challenge to Canada as within our defense system, no 
infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; today it is our policy of no 
one dominant nation over all Europe or Asia that is being chal­
lenged. That fact accounts for the notable shift in our tactical dis­
positions, in new political emphases, and in dramatic economic man­
euvers; but it does not in any way mean the abandonment of other 
policies, nor does it mean that we are over-committed, because 
while there is a very heavy threat in one area, there is virtual 
absence of challenge in others. 
The purpose of this review of the underlying considerations 
in foreign policy is to lift our sights from the daily and immediate, 
the complex and the confusing. It is designed to help us look at 
the broader significance which time and analysis can reveal. The 
seriousness of the current situation is abundantly clear. We do not 
want even a tactical reverse. Nevertheless no one ever achieves all 
his objectives; whether we like it or not we must expect some re­
verses because our opponent is strong, resourceful, and determined. 
The recent temper of Americans has been one of reacton from the 
stimulation of victory; it may well have moved from the over-optim-
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will be sounder if is founded upon a long-range view. 
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OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Bruce C. Hopper 
at the Naval War College 
March 30, 1950 
I have cherished so much the privilege of coming to the Naval 
War College. I feel like Paul among the Athenians-the Athen­
ians were always looking for some new thing. I think the Navy is 
that way too. Now I will try to bring out some new ideas here. 
What I want to bring out in the first place is time in terms of con­
trol of the time table, and not time as distinct from space in terms 
of civilization. 
It is hard to make revelations about Russia except to repeat 
constantly that . there is still darkness in Scythia. I find after 
having had six years away from academic life that what measure 
of retreat or withdrawal one gets in the academic circle somehow 
lengthens the perspective. It may be that the role of professor is 
just to find things that are overlooked by the experts. 
In my instance what I have been looking for is the some­
thing that America once had and has lost. The perspective turns 
to western civilization and there are several things which stand out 
in my mind. The first is that the Bolsheviks are still completely 
convinced that they can last longer than we can in this type of 
struggle. The second is that they still control the. time table. The 
third is that America's disunity is an aid and comfort to the Bol­
sheviks and the despair of our friends. And the fourth is that the 
Bolsheviks use time in their calculations as well as space. 
Doctor Hopper is Professor of International Relations at Harvard 
University and has written several books and articles on Russia. 
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Now I know that you have studied a great deal about poli­
tics and you will agree with me that timing is the master control 
in any program of politics. Time must not be overemphasized but 
one must think of time. Senator Dixon, one time governor of Mon­
tana, used to say that the strange thing is that you go on preparing 
and preparing and preparing for something called life, and then 
one day yqu awaken to realize that that for which you had been 
preparing has already passed you by. It may be that the dem­
ocracies, in facing Bolshevism, go on preparing for a type of strug-
gle that'ma:y never come off: A-bombs, H-bombs, bacteria-all 
that. The struggle might be rather, i� the Russian phrase, a 
"kto-kogo" ( ?) . Who beats who? Who can outlast the other? It 
may be an attrition not unlike that between the popes and the 
emperors for centuries in the Middle Ages. 
Obviously all you have to do is read the newspapers or talk 
to a Russian to realize that the Bolsheviks are much more confi­
dent than we are that they can outlast us. The reason is that it is 
much easier to chop down trees than to replant the forest. They 
are more time conscious. We are not time conscious. The Lord 
didn't give · us much patience here in America. We are a speed 
people---'-'get it done yesterday-and we want . what we want when 
we want it-but quick. Well, in playing chess with the Bolsheviks, 
that type of impatience may cost us the queen. 
I want to talk about time, always remembering that there 
is a tide in the affairs of men, etc. The totalitarians plan more. 
They are compelled to be more time conscious and yet it is surprising 
how much help they got from the outside in their effort to gain con­
trol of the time table. In the case of Hitler, for instance, you 
can see how the Communists in Germany helped put him in power. 
They allied with Hitler against the Weimar Republic. You can see 
how President Roosevelt helped insure Hitler in power by devaluing 
20 RESTRICTED 
23
Naval War College: September 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
• 
RESTRICTED 
the dollar and thus wi1>ed out 40% of the German debt in 1933, 
overnight; how the British gave favorable trade terms; how the 
Russians, instead of returning wheat as in the contract for the two 
billion . gold marks of machinery supplied by Weimar Germany, 
made the payment to Hitler in gold and in armament materials.. The 
. outside powers set it up for Hitler and then he went with machine 
gun staccato from one point to another after he _had got control of 
the time table about 1936, or even 1935. 
It was that chronic indecision of the democracies; that in­
ability to concentrate on the real enemy. Think of all the gun­
ning we did for Mussolini at that time. He could have been had. 
There were only a few rocks in the desert-:--a little something on 
his chest. He kept telling his people it is better to live one hour 
like a lion:than a.hundred years like a sheep. They didn't believe 
it. If we had given him a little something we could have kept him 
on our side of the fence and the war might have been different. 
But in World War II, by the deal with Hitler in August 
1939, the Bolsheviks collected loot until June 1941, and were in 
abeyance· until· October of 1944 when General Bor put on the up­
rising of Warsaw. Our intelligence people say that if they had 
kept on coming west the war might have been over the winter of 
1944 or 45. But no. The Red Army was diverted into the Danube 
to beat the British to Vienna and so. on. From th�n onward, as I
study the records, the Bolsheviks have controlled the time tables. 
· At Yalta they determined when they would enter the Pacific
war, for a price. They forced the second ceremony of surrender at 
Berlin (after the one at Reims). Thereafter they turned on the 
heat and turned it off again, forcing us to put the airlift on Berlin 
and deciding when it would cease, the heat on Iran� the heat cm 
China, etc., etc. Who controls the time table determines not .only 
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the order of events in general, but determines the rules, the prin­
ciples, . and the fashions of the period. To control the time table 
is to get into the driver's seat. 
Now I think that there are a number of requirements. I 
would like to cite ten selected areas in which America's indecision 
allows the Bolsheviks to keep control of the time table. If we are 
going to get control, we have to make up our minds about these 
particular areas. 
As St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If the trumpet gives 
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" Well, the 
answer is of course, no one. During the war, our trumpet had a 
very certain sound. Of course there was a unity of purpose which 
has since been squandered, and our danger as a nation is perhaps 
even greater now-greater in the long terms of history than it was 
when the submarines were at the gates, because this danger has to 
do with the rise and fall, not only of nations, but of civilization. 
And in the long attrition which I see ahead our shining new weapons 
may not even be taken out of their wraps. So long as the Bol­
sheviks control the time table, they determine the weapons. And 
they don't want a shooting war. 
So here are ten suggestions in areas where America is con­
spicuous for indecision. The first one: We must have a clear 
definition of our relations with the Bolsheviks, a definition upon 
which we will agree. Now what is it? It is not war and it certainly 
is not peace. But that is exactly what Trotsky said when he 
stomped home from the first part of the Brest-Litovsk peace con­
ference in January, 1918., He wouldn't sign anything with the Ger­
mans. He said, "No war, no peace," and ran back to Moscow. The 
old soldier, General Hoffman, was not impressed with that Bolshevik 
logic, so he ordered the German Army to unlimber the guns. And 
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it was then that Lenin decided there would be peace-at least on 
paper. Trotsky's formula of January 1918-no war, .no peace-was 
not implemented actually until 1945. That is what we are living 
under-no war, no peace. 
So how are we going to define this? I think we have to de­
fine it before we can get out of this trap of indecision. ,Suppose we 
call it tentatively-"War-in-Peace". Now that would 'raise a hue 
and cry, I know, but "cold war" is too passive a term. "Cold war'' 
doesn't denote the pressures: Acceptance of the phrase "War-in­
Peace" might change the psychology of the country and put us 
on the rails back to the unity of purpose which has been lost. 
Recently Dean Acheson came forth with a new phrase­
Total Diplomacy. Well, that's good. That denotes action at any 
rate, but how about something a little bit snappier than that? The 
phrase came to me in the middle of the night as they often do., I 
don't know whether you get up and write them down, but I have 
learned to do it, because they are gone in the morning. This phrase 
came to me-Jujitsu Diplomacy. That's a little spectacular I ad­
mit. The idea of jujitsu is to force the opponent to use his. own 
strength to break his own bones. That's exactly what the Bolshe­
viks do to us.. They use our own citizens - against us-freedom of 
speech, freedom of this anp that. In other words, they use Ameri-_ 
can privileges to destroy America. Dean Acheson's speech in _Cali­
fornia I think was a bit jujitsu. You know, Seven Pillars of Wis­
dom on how to make Bolshevik muscles go backward. That's 
what that speech meant. He knew it wouldn't accomplish anything, 
except a roar from Moscow, but it was a jujitsu tactic. So, .if we 
are forced to agree that peace is not around the corner, that a 
shooting war is not around the corner, I think it would be_ useful 
to accept a formula that would define the exact conditions, some-
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thing like a state of War-in-Peace .. We have no precedence and no 
rules for such a relationship. 
Last December I was out � Pittsburgh. One of the �hings· 
I wanted to see was that battlefield in Monogahela where General 
Braddock fought in 1755. It is all grown up with steel mills now. 
f reread Francis Parkman to get the story straight. Ge:geral Brad-
· dock was a very gallant soldier but· knew nothing about· Indians .
. There was shooting from· behind the trees. So he spoke to the Vir­
ginians, to George Washington. He said, "Stand out there and fight
like soldiers," and so on. Afterwards he said, "This isn't war. This
is murder." He lost his force, and he himself was wounded and died.
Now it seems to me that the democracies are doing what 
Braddock was doing, using the rules and principles of honorable 
war against the Indians in America. If we are going·to survive the 
long attrition, we have to get rid of the General Braddock notions. 
One of the first things to do is to decide on a definition of this 
struggle---e. g., War-in-Peace. 
Then a second decision. I thiiµt this is tearing us apart-· 
this loyalty, security-risk business. The Bolsheviks feel more and 
more copfident that all they have to do is wait while we blow our­
selves apart. · Students of history have seen all this happening be­
fore in Greece and in Rome. And we are seeing it happening to us 
�this indecision among the citizens on the question of loyalty and 
' 
. 
security. It is not a question of loyalty, actually. It is a qu�_stion 
of security risk at the policy level or for classified material. 
But in judging and in charging our citizens, I believe the issue 
is·the degree of.tolerance they show for the enemies of our society� 
internal and external. In their minds, they are completely loyal and 
they may even think they are good security· risks. Many of them 
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are frustrated intellectuals. They call themselves liberals-actually 
they are to liberalism what Hellenistic was to Hellenic-something 
pseudo, subsequent, and Easternized. Many find refuge in the aca­
demic profession and there they rest on their morals in a sort of 
detached intellectual neutrality., The label is given to those people 
I think, by the writer of Revelations: "Because thou art neither 
hot nor cold, but lukewarm, I will spew thee from my mouth." I 
think these people who are neutral in times of peril will be spewed 
from the mouth of history. Even the little peasants of Eastern 
Europe have a firmer grasp on history. They say that in times of 
crisis, either you sing with the angels or you will be forced to howl 
with the wolves. There is no happy middle ground. Now perhaps 
the Supreme Court will get us out of this trap. It is bad business 
and is getting worse. 
The third point of the area requmng decision: What is 
the political direction of our country? This is something that will 
have to go to a national decision. You and I are living with it. 
Economically it involves government spending-the danger of bank­
ruptcy. It includes academic folks and service people, and aHthose 
on fixed incomes and frozen salaries. We see what has been hap. 
pening in Europe. There has been a transfer of power since 1914 
from the middle class which ruled for over a hundred years. Power 
is transferred from the middle class to the industrial working class. 
The middle class is being disposessed by a war of taxes. 
This means in Europe, and will mean for us, more and more 
people shifted over to government employment, a swelling bureau� 
cracy-the bureaucracy then absorbing the intelligensia and taking 
on the mentality of trade unionism. The creative instinct then dies. 
Who then will bear the torch? There is a line in Virgil that. says, 
"Easy is the descent to Hell�" You can misquote Virgil a little bit 
by saying that easy is the descent to mediocrity. As Joseph Alsop 
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wrote, "Mediocrity begets mediocrity," whether by the crony sys­
tem or however else. 
When we stop putting quality into the individual, then we 
start making a mass man. In mass men the Bolsheviks are a long 
way ahead of us. I can say, as a historian, and I have spent most 
of my time studying history, when everyone is safe, then no one 
is free. As we move in that direction the time will come when our 
Statue of Liberty will drop the torch and merely hold a monkey 
wrench. Security-a monkey wrench! 
At any rate, if that process is abrupt then we will have too 
few moral leaders in the next generation. If it is gradual and spread 
over a number of decades, then perhaps we might train moral lead­
ers and be able to pass on to them the mantle so that the standards 
will not perish. That is really the great issue of the welfare state. 
And yet at night when you are alone you sometimes can hear 
Madame Lafarge with her knitting needles at the foot of the guil­
lotine. It can all happen again because the brutalization of western 
man is something that we can't measure in our times. 
Now the fourth question: What kind of Germany do we 
want? America has not made up her mind. There our trumpet 
has a very uncertain .sound. Some Americans say, "Let German 
bodies defend the Ruhr." Germany's historic role was in the North 
Sea, the.cradle of our democracy. Western Germany is now the key­
stone of the arch of a third power in defense of the Atlantic sea­
board. Much of our democracy came from German tribal sources. 
We can't have it both ways as I see it. Either we take western 
Germany into the western family and promote unification of all 
Germany, or we must be prepared to see the Germans accept the 
Bolshevik unification on the assumption that they, the Germans, in 
time can outwit the Russians. That is why I feel pained in reading 
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the "Times" this morning that they are not going to allow the 
Bonn government to have proper representation in the London 
meeting. I think it is wrong. I think we should override England 
-the Labor government at any rate-on such things. Our bigger
hope for Germany is a Franco-German rapprochment.
A friend of mine, just back from Paris, was telling me about 
the new 0. E. E. C. headquarters building which these governments 
themselves paid for and built on the grounds of the chateau that 
formerly belonged to the Rothschilds. They were confronted with 
a problem in bringing in the machinery. There was a beautiful line 
of trees there, Now the Bolshevik method would be to say, "To hell 
with the trees, get them out!' I must say that the American method 
would also tend in that direction. But these people did not think 
that way. They erected scaffolding and managed with a great deal 
of effort to bring in the machinery over the tops of the trees. They 
are very proud because that method signifies the spirit in this new 
Europe: preserve what is left of beauty and at the same time 
achieve something functional and streamlined. In that new Europe 
there is that essential keystone place for Germany. So what do we 
do? Do we throw Germany to the wolves or . do we. take her in ? 
The Germans would like to know and we have to make up our minds 
soon. 
The fifth area is somewhat similar: What do we do about 
Japan? Asia is, of course, in this process of rebirth and has been 
my main subject for study for twenty years. There will be five-year 
plans attempted around Asia. As these new states in the southern 
zone move forward in nationalism and independence, I rather expect 
to see a shift in diplomatic emphasis from Ea�tern Europe. We are 
going to be squeezed out there, and then we will shift our em­
phasis over to Southern Asia. 
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Now here is Japan-----0ur special problem! Japan had wQrked 
out her old solution with the material at hand-an economic solution� 
We stopped it and crushed Japan. So we have to provide something 
else or let Japan go the road of China. What are we 1oing to do? 
. Are we going to let Japan's industry recover based on a two-way 
exchang�raw materials, industrial products, etc. with Southeast 
Asia? · That would seem to be our policy. 
Le.t us terminate the state of war with Japan. We have more 
. ·control out there than we have in Europe. , Especially in General 
MacArthur we have a Pro-Consul on a heroic scale. I think we 
ought to bring him home and give him a Roman triumph to show 
him that his work will be perpetuated and get on with the job so 
that we can hold on to Japan .. That should be done soon. Here we 
do have master control. 
Now the sixth question, which is on a larger scale. Let us 
consider whether our crises today involves · Bolshevik expansion 
per se or old style Russian imperialism. The Russians in history 
have always absorbed their rulers. A number of times a ruler 
such as Peter the Great, or Alexan�er the First has made great 
effort to modernize the Russians. The process goes on for a while 
and then it lapses. ,Russianism re-emerges after· several decades. 
Is that going to happen this time? We have had three attempts at 
hegemony in Europe-in modern times I mean-French--Louis XIV, 
Napoleon; Teuton--Kaiser Wilhelm, and then Hitler� Now comes 
Veliki Ross led by the Bolsheviks'. We wilf have to determine 
whether this is a -racial thing or purely revolutionary Bolshevism. 
What will we be fighting in 20 years? Will it be a type of im­
perialism that is ·more Russian than Bolshevik? Or will the Bol­
sheviks by that time have taken over an· the satellites · and all of 
Asia, and confront us with a revolutionary imperialism. You must 
understand that this is a Bolshevik�hate-America campaign. It may 
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peter out. We don't know. All l know is that the Russians never 
had their day. One faseinating study is to try to discover in ad­
vance when they will bring in their brands. Will they revert to 
religious, reevangelization, given the freedom to do so? 
We can expect a Bolshevik claim for Alaska somewhere along 
· the line. They may make it for nuisance value. They'll simply say
thatthe corrupt Tzarist government officials sold Alaska, that it was
never legal, etc., etc., etc. They wouldn't expect to get it back of
course, Jbut just say it for nuisance value. That will come. So in
order to defeat the enemy in a cold or hot war,· we must differ from
them, not in degree but in kind, and understand whether they are
predominantly Russian, Communist, or Bolshevik.
Now the sev�nth question, and I appeal to you as war­
riors: Who are our :fighting Allies? Let us pick our Allies and 
give them of our substance and our vitality, and let the others 
fade .  Let us not permit the false ideas of our peace mongers to in­
terfere with this lasting decision in strategy. The :first thing that 
strikes us in thinking of Allies, is that our friends of yesteryear 
may be our foes of tomorrow. Two good examples are Czechoslo­
vakia and China. Conversely, people that we. fought may be our 
friends in -strategic bases ·tomorrow-Germany in the west, and 
Japan. 
Much depends on the ruling group at the time. Italy, for 
instance, was with us in the first World War and against us in 
the second. Turkey was against us. in the first, but preserved . a 
neutrality in our favor in the second. We must seek allies in terms 
of these shifting affinities, and then have one criterion. Yes, send 
supplies here and there, but consider would we go hunting tigers 
with the people in question? Would they climb trees when a tiger 
came? Let us have it simple and direct. If we would hunt tigers 
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with them, then let's build them up; Our friends include the na­
tions in the North Sea area in general, Western Germ�ny, and also 
Greece and Turkey. They are tiger hunters and so is Japan. The 
Japanese will defend their rice patties. I believe Franc�Spain wiU 
fight too. When our strategic thoughts will turn to Spain we will 
suddenly find that we haven't been so terribly hostile to Franco 
after all. His country will fit into the strategic picture. · There­
fore, who are our fighting Allies? Let's decide and hand out our 
favors accordingly. 
My eighth point concerns our principles. What are they 
to be in this type of struggle, this War-in-Peace. They· can't be 
haphazard. You in the Navy know that well. The first essential 
in regard to our principles is to know the enemy's principles. The 
outstanding principle of the Bolsheviks is continuous expansion 
without shooting wars. Their justification of that is their defin­
ition of popular sovereignty. For instance, they have sixteen union 
, republics; and they say that each one is sovereign and each is 
equal, at an international conference, to any foreign·· state. There­
fore it doesn't lose its popular sovereignty on becoming part of the 
glorious Soviet Union. Each Union Republic is considered sovereign 
because it has the constitutional right to withdraw. Of course, we 
· could prove the illusion of all that. However, this point I want to
make: By popular sovereignty the Bolsheviks have justified a sys­
tem of expansion which is without precedent in history.
We will not review the whole list of territories they have 
taken since 1939. You will see . how easy and wonderful it is for 
them, and h.,ow we have allowed it all to happen because we didn't 
contest them on this method of popular sovereignty. Start at 
this point: the frontiers. That is where popular sovereignty can be 
utilized. Note that in the various frontiers there is a tribal kin­
ship with the peoples outside the frontiers. This is utilized by the 
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Bolsheviks when it · comes to expansion. The first one that is of 
special interest to you in the Navy is the Norwegian frontier. Ex­
amine the Arctic coast, the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. In that 
area live the people of Anderson's fairy tales, the Lapps. I forget 
the exact number overall, but they exist in the Russian part, in 
.Sweden, and in Norway. In that area is the largest and most val­
uable notrhernmost port of the world, Narvik. If they controlled 
the Arctic coast, there wouldn't be that convoy trouble around 
North Cape again as in the last war. · A Lapps' Peoples Republic 
would unite the natives of that northern zone. They would probably 
even speak of a Lapp proletariat. They don't have to be consistent, 
you see, in putting this thing over. 
Another hot frontier with ·a .. similar tribal kinship present 
is down in Macedonia. I am not quite sure in my mind just what 
is a Macedonian. We know that some of them live in Greece, some 
in Yugoslavia and some in Bulgaria. I don't know whether there are 
any in Albania or not, but the Macedonian movement is always 
there. They do have a literary langu�ge of their own. So when 
the movement comes, when it is propitious for the Russians to put 
the heat on Macedonia, then they will operate out of Bulgaria. 
Another interesting area is in Turkey, U. S. S. R. because 
the Armenian questions people outside the frontier. Armenia, of 
course, in the 13th and 14th centuries was a very powerful state in 
the Near East, thus the memory of a glorious tradition. When 
the Russians get ready to put the heat on Turkey for control of 
the Straits, then a Greater Armenian Peoples Republic · is to be 
expected. It is a set-up. The same thing applies to Azerbaijan. The 
Azerbaijan people on the Soviet side and the Azerbaijan people on 
the Persian side are .of the same Turkish stock, neither Persian or 
Russian. The strength of this racial desire or racial coherence is 
again an instrument that the Bolsheviks could and would use when 
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they get ready to push for the Suez and India. Now note the 1 
relations of China with the old tributary states. Siam as well as 
Burma fall into a special category. Anything can happen there. 
Then in the course of twenty years with this Russian glacier com­
ing into the Bay of Bengal on the East and down to the Persian 
Gulf on the West, India would be in the pincers. That may be 
what we'll see before we ever get to a shooting war. 
So I say, that confronted with enemy principles in. opera� 
tion, we must have our principles of our aim; Let us see how far 
the immutable principles of war, so-called, could be applied to a prO'.­
longed attrition without shooting. 
First-Objective. The objective in this type of war I have 
described is to overcome the enemy's will.to expand through the use 
of popular sovereignty without shooting. That is what he wants­
to expand without shooting. Now we must.overcome his will. That 
is the objective. The second principle-,..,.Offensive. That means,,to 
contr.ol the time table. A direct idea of offensive is to control the 
time· table and take the initiative. Let us dwell on those two and 
leaving aside all the others-economy of·force,·movement, surprise, 
etc.,-except for logistics. 
My ninth requirement in this War-in-Peace is Logistics-­
what to do about matepal production, imports, exports, etc. Logis­
tics is a requirement and a principle. Effective ·preparations. and 
decisions must be made to determine the necessary amounts of 
supplies and man power to be utilized. 
The tenth point, and this is my clinchng thought in this 
development, is what interim strategy should we have at • this 
time in this War-in-Peace? I arrive at that by giving our in­
.terim strategy if we applied just the two first and most important 
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principles of war.. I would say that the principle of objectives is the 
restoration of the balance of power in Europe. That is our only way 
to get back to free wheeling. I don't want to go through the history 
of security, from unity to balance of power, to this collective idea, 
the universal type under the League of Nations and the U. N., and 
to the regional type that we are now working out in the North At­
lantic Treaty. 
I will say, as a student of history, that I believe that the 
only feasible method of the state system, as presently constituted, 
is balance of power. That is exactly what we are doing. I think we 
have no complaint to find with the State Department. By the poli­
tical means (the North Atlantic Alliance, plus the Franco-German 
rapprochment,) the economic means (the ECA) and the military 
means, this process is now going on. Military assistance to gov­
ernments of Europe would strengthen their hands against internal 
sabotage and destroy the illusion that an aggressor could have a 
quick campaign without much bloodshed, as the Germans believed 
in 1914 and again in 1939. Above all, while we are arming Europe, 
the most important objective is to deny the Atlantic seaboard to 
the Russian snorkels. German submarines in two wars came pretty 
close to pulling it off. Maybe next time the Russian snorkels, with 
German help, might be able to do it. At any rate, when that 
vacuum created by World War II is filled, and Western Europe in­
tegrated-at least in a military sense-then, with a Third Power 
in existence, the Balance of Power is restored. 
Now the second principle-the principle of offensive. I 
will try to give you something new which you can toss back at me. 
And I won't be able to defend it. I think that the offensive is 
just as necessary to victory in this type of War-in-Peace as it is in 
a shooting war. Some of you will recall that the French, at the 
time of the Battle of the Marne, retreated, dragging their guns 
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through the dust. For days they retreated, retreated, retreated. 
Finally came the order, "Stand on the hills, south of the Marne. 
Point your guns north and get ready to advance." Well, you might 
say a thrill went through that army. A psychological change came 
over the French after their retreat; retreat and then advance! That 
is what I want to see happen to our country. First we must take 
the offensive in this interim strategy (and it is only interim). 
The Russians stalk out of the U. N. Let them stay out. They 
need the U. N. Let us not forget it. We must not repeat the 
blunder we made during the war, assuming that they wanted a 
separate peace. That was a crowning blunder stemming, I believe, 
from the White House. Let them get the idea that the U. N. is 
pointed towards an alliance outside the Iron Curtain. But let us 
not make the mistake of saying that it is useless to _operate with­
out the Bolsheviks. As for the Chinese delegates who are the tar­
gets of their fire, if we throw Dr. Tsiang to the wolves we will de­
serve very small credit in history. Keep him on ice and give him 
some function until the Assembly meets in September, and then, 
who knows, we might be able to run him as a candidate and get a 
new Secretary General. It might be a good idea. That would be 
putting cockleburrs under the saddle of the Bolsheviks. That's 
what I call offensive.
Now the offensive we can take in regards to the atomic af­
fair. International inspection would mean the end of Bolshevism. 
What about those fifteen million or more slave laborers? They 
simply cannot allow foreigners to run around in Russia. So if we 
had their consent to inspection, it would be postponed. But we can 
do a lot amongst ourselves. We can at least unify the western 
allies on atomic policies. 
34 RESTRICTED 
37
Naval War College: September 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
Next come the offensive in regard to Germany. Let us 
terminate the state of war with all German people-not only West­
ern Germany, but Eastern Germany. It is not yet the time for 
making a peace treaty. The Bolsheviks may go in and perhaps an­
nex Eastern Germany. We have them in a box now. We can do 
a little jujitsu if we are clever enough. The Kremlin cannot unify 
Germany wi�hout making a fifth partition of Poland. That's our 
jujitsu. Let's get on with it. And immediately what shall we do? 
They talk about launching the youths of Eastern Germany into 
Berlin in May. Let's send General Clay back to Berlin. He's the 
idol of the German people. What are we doing with him now? 
Why, he-is lecturing at Harvard this week. There's a bigger job 
than that for him. Send him back there with any kind of cooked­
up mission just so he is there in Berlin, because he is a figure that 
the Germans trust. It would be a signal to them that we do not 
intend to get out of Berlin. Take the offensive. 
Go in and make an offensive in regard to this national com­
munism from outside the Iron Curtain-Yugoslavia, China, and 
the others. The State Department has a policy of erosion, I 
don't know exactly what it means but it sounds good. I would say 
that the offensive in the Far East should include the termina­
tion of the state of war in Japan and building up the economic 
answer to Japan through southeast Asia and eventually point to 
trade with China so as to get Japan off the taxpayers' neck here 
in America. These offensives must be multiplied, using all types 
-Point Four economic strategy, etc. My idea is that somewhere
along the line, after we get into the habit, we can take the of­
fensive. I don't mean at the drop of a hat, but to work it out in 
time. As long as we do not take the offensive we will never get 
· control of the time table. If we do take it somewhere along the
line while we are keeping our atoms d:ry, we will awaken one day
to find we have the stop watch and that we are calling the time.
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A long buildup is necessary because our people assume that 
an offensive is something wicked and practiced only by aggressors 
bent on a shooting war. That isn't true at all. An offensive is the 
only way that we can save ourselves from perishing through at­
trition and from crumbling within. As an example of our blunder­
ing zeal, I could quote the Nuremberg trials. We have got to"get 
as far. away from Nuremberg psychology as we possibly can. We 
have to adopt a technique we have never met before in history. In 
other words, we must call on God to help us. Everything was a liv­
ing contradiction in these trials, with the Russians being judges in 
their own cause and preventing the Katyn massacre from coming 
before the court. I won't cite it, but · I do hope that members of 
the college will take advantage of the opportunity to read about the· 
Katyn massacre in the report I am leaving here. 
Now there is just one more thought. As part of our offensive 
technique--our preservation of strength-let us keep our President 
at home. By that I mean that every time an American President 
has gone abroad, it has brought disaster on Western civilization. It 
looks as though the President goes into the camp of the Philistines 
and, like Samson, he gets his hair cut when he is asleep. You can 
see it in the case of President Wilson for instance. There he was 
with his Fourteen Points, the loftiest peace program ever devised 
by man. He was sitting pretty. Then ·came the armistice! All he 
had to do was to sit still and say, "Here we are., Make your terms 
and bring them over to me. I have the Army. I have the Navy. I 
have the money. So decide between yourselves and then let me 0. K. 
it." Something happened to him in November. I do not know 
whether Mrs. Wilson had a yen for Paris or not_. I do know that 
the· French Ambassador handed a memo to President Wilson pro­
posing· that the victorious Allies not negotiate with the vanquished 
powers, but decide among themselves the · terms and then call in 
the Germans merely to sign. That was contrary. to Wilson's prin-
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ciples of life. But he simply tossed the thing in his trunk. After 
all he was going to Paris, in spite of the fact that Colonel House 
said, "Don't Mr. President, don't come to Europe. Stay there in 
America."· He went to Paris. 
President Wilson landed in Brest and one description which 
I read in the French papers said that there hadn't been such a scene 
since Julius Caesar set out to conquer Britain in 54 B. C. From 
there he came to Paris. But did he follow Colonel House's in-
·, 
junction. to get on the American train, go to the American part 
of the front, speak to . the troops, then fall back to the balcony at 
the Embassy in Paris to receive the plaudits of the multitudes and 
then get back on the SS George Washington and go home? No! 
On the fourteenth of December, the crowd just choked the square 
from wall to wall. Here came the .Messiah from the west! And 
with Mrs. Wilson in that shining new automobile-well, it was 
more than the old Presbyterian could stand. He was just carried 
away and he stayed. He lingered there amongst the Philistines 
and began to get his hair cut. One by one his points went down 
the drain. And in the final analysis, he got his covenant hitched 
onto the treaty and he had to agree to all those thing&-the giv­
ing away of Shantung, etc., which caused the Senate to toss the 
whole thing out of the window. 
Looking back, we see that if President Wilson had only 
stayed at home and allowed the mountain to come to Mohammed, 
history would have been different. Who learned a lesson from 
that? Not President Roosevelt, because he used to go over and 
have.a·chat with Stalin without taking his long·spoon. Rememl>er? 
And so there has been one conference after another. We won't 
go into them. We will just say that there was disaster stemming 
from Yalta which will perhaps be with the human race for a cen­
tury. And then President Truman came to Potsdam. At least he 
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put his chop on things. The power of the President is so vast that 
we should not allow him to go on the front side of the Statue of 
Liberty. 
You read in the press, as we are reading now, about other 
Presidential trips. All these people, including even Senator Tyd­
ings who knows better, and Churchill, who knows better with his 
tongue in cheek, know it is all nonsense. We have had enough 
presidential haircuts to last us for a century. So I say keep the 
President at home as part of this new type of thinking. 
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RECOMMENDED READING 
For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional 
reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here­
with. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields and 
totals approximately 7,000 pages. 
"War or Peace" 
I. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Dulles ( 1950) 
This book, autobiographical in nature, is a study of the 
present world situation and what might and should be 
done about it. Mr. Dulles presents the military struc­
ture of the Communist Party and reveals a keen under­
standing of its techniques and objectives. As stated 
in his conclusion, "If our efforts are still inadequate, 
it is because we have not seen clearly the challenge 
and its nature". He does much to correct this. 
''The Coming Defeat of Comm�nism'' Burnham ( 1949) 
An appraisal of the workings of Communism and the 
optimistic opinion that Communism will be defeated. 
The author, an ex-Communist is thoroughly familiar 
with the methods and objectives of Communism and 
against this background critically examines our con­
tainment policy. The premise advanced in an earlier 
book, "The Struggle for the World", that we are at war 
now with Communism and have been since 1943 is 
again proposed. The author's plan consists of recogniz­
ing this state of war; determining the objective which 
he believes sho�ld be nothing short of the def eat of 
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offensive political-subversive war. This type of un­
orthodox warfare would consist basically of propa­
ganda warfare in all its many ramific�tions. The 
author believes that Communism and Capitalism are 
irreconcilable. Convincing conclusions are drawn of 
the world political scene but the plan of action for the 
def eat of Communism is not clearly outlined. 
"My Three Years in Moscow" Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith (1950) 
General Smith's report covers his personal and official 
experiences and problems as United States ambassador 
to Russia from March 1946 to March 1949. It is illum­
inating and interesting, particularly because of the 
combined_ military and. ambassadorial character of 
General Smith. 
Pares ( 1949)
A short history of Russia written by the distinguished 
Russian historian. The epilogue gives an evaluation 
of Russia's internal situation and her position in the 
world today. 
uThe Price of Power'' Baldwin ( 1947) 
A thorough presentation of the political, economic 
and military position of the United States and an 
inventory of the military strength, new military de­
velopments and industrial power of the United States 
in relation to other world powers. New world strategy 
and .new tactical considerations are discussed. Possi­
bilities as to the future course of events are analyzed 
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"Ha/.f Slave, Half Free" Abend (1950) 
A veteran newsman's world-wide coverage of the 
gloomy Cold War situation as of early 1950. With no 
punches pulled he appraises the gains of Communism 
and the sp�radic and ineffective short range diplomatic 
efforts of the U. S. to curb its growth throughout 
the world. 
"Blueprint for Wqrld Conquest as Outlined by the Communist 
pp 
291 
International," (1946) 258 
The Communist equivalent of "Mein Kampf". A re-
print of some original Communist documents in which 
they have set forth exactly what and how they plan 
to conquer the world. 
"ls War with Russia lnevitab.le" (Reader's Digest, March, 1950) 
Kennan 9 
This article, written by a high official of the State 
Department, brilliantly examines the conflict with 
Russian Communism and those considerations in­
fluencing the commencement of an all-out war. The au-
thor gives us a framework of rather vague generalities 
which, if carried out, few will disagree should guide us 
successfully through the present "cold war". He con-
cludes that war, although a possibility, is not probable 
in the light of an analysis of the future course of 
Russia and Russian Communism. 
"Sources of Soviet Conduct" "X" Foreign Affair-S, July 1947 
(Kennan) 17 
Concise, hard-hitting evaluation of Russian and Com­
munist aims and their determination to overthrow 
the West and def eat capitalism. 
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t'Slalin on Revolution" Foreign Affairs, January 1949 
An authoritative analysis of Stalin's pronouncements 
and of their influence on Communist thinking and 
policy throughout the world. 
II. WORLD WAR II AND THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
OF MILITARY FORCES 
t'Modern Arms and Free Men" Vannevar Bush ( 1949) 
Dr. Bush scientifically evaluates modern weapons and 
assigns them relative importance in a future war. 
Moreover he relates the weapons to man's eternal 
struggle for freedom from domination by those who 
would dominate. He clearly shows why education is a 
basic requirement in a democratic system. Throughout 
the book the author's deep belief in the ultimate 
triumph of men of good will is manifest. 
The book is at once significant and authoritative. Pub­
lished as it is at the very moment the United States is 
preparing to embark on a huge program for .military 
defense of Western Europe, its value is inestimable. 
For Dr. Bush points out that today defensive weapons 
(with some notable exceptions such as the submarine) 
appear to be gaining over offensive power. The book 
has only one apparent defect. It was written before the 
atomic explosion in Russia. The military man who 
reads this book (and none can afford not to) will en­
counter statements which Dr. Bush might not have 
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Hessler ( 1949) 
This important and timely book strikes deep at the 
roots of world and national problems and appraises 
the factors influencing our national policies today. The 
geopolitical,scene, carefully related to our own respon-
sibilities in the world today, is brilliantly examined. 
The importance of sea power to us because of our fa­
vorable geographic position is carefully delineated to 
show its impact in the shaping of a sound foreign pol­
icy. Military strategy, as it is being evolved in the 
highest councils of government, is critically examined. 
Mass destruction area bombing, as a method of conduc­
ting strategic air warfare, is strongly attacked from 
the standpoint of being militarily unsound and morally 
in def en_sible. 
The author makes a strong case to discredit the Douhet 
concept of .strategic air warfare. However, Mr. Hessler 
in no way deprecates the effectiveness of land-based 
air. The military advantages open to us as an "island 
power" (strategic connotation of the phrase) of exer­
cising the offensive capability of sea-air power in any 
foreseeable war is enthusiastically developed. Whether 
or not one agrees with the emphasis placed on the stra­
tegic significance of carrier-based tactical air does not 
detract from his conclusion which no student of air· 
power can contest: i. e., the heart of air power is com­
mand of the air, and further, the fighter plane is the 
means of gaining or disputing this ultimate goal. 
This book is worthy of concientious study by all mem­
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pies of the author's navy partisanship. However, the 
vital problems dealt with are clearly and logically 
expressed and analyzed. 
"U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War" 
PP 
Ballantine ( 1947 ) 308 
While the title is very broad, the book confines itself 
primarily to a discussion of National and Depart­
mental Logistics. In this restricted field the author 
makes an excellent analysis of an important problem. 
"If Russia Strikes" Eliot (1949) 
A discussion of the probability of a war between the 
U.S. S. R. and her satellites and the Western Powers, 
the character and timing of such a war, the probable 
theaters, roles of the various armed forces on both 
sides, etc. in the near future. 
"Soviet Arms and Air Power" Guillaume ( 1949) 
This book recounts briefly the highlights of the mil­
itary operations in Germany and USSR on the Eastern 
Front during World War II. It contains an analysis 
of the factors of Soviet strength, including: the com­
mand and administrative structure of the Red Army 
and its relationship to the Communist party; factors 
of manpower and populations ; morale; and the em­
ployment of ground and air forces. The most sig­
nificant aspect of this book is the treatment given 
the war effort of the Soviet economy. 
252 
212 
"What Kind of War'' (Atlantic Monthly, July, 1949) Baldwin 20 
Hanson Baldwin gives us a refreshing presentation 
44 RESTRICTED 
47
Naval War College: September 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
pp 
of the all too neglected principle that the determin­
ation of . the objective is the first step in the prep­
aration for war. He then discusses the capabilities and 
limitations of atomic arid strategic air warfare, atomic 
policy, and the political, psychological and morale fac­
tors in war, 
'The Atlantic Pact" Hoskins ( 1949) 
This book ·gives a brief but thorough account of the 
events leaping up to the -Atlantic Pact, and also tells 
why each country joined the Pact. It is complete in 
citing specific speeches and doctrines, as well as in 
furnishing a reproduction of the Pact itself. An ex­
cellent account of U. S. foreign policy as it is today. 
'"Western European Union" Hawtrey ( 1949) 
A . primer for the English public, setting forth the 
English point of view on European Union, including 
the problems with proposed solutions. The whole prob­
lem is related to the Marshall Plan, military aid, and 
the North Atlantic Pact. Every officer of the services 
of the USA should read this in order to appreciate 
the viewpoint of our main ally. It is clearly and simply 
written and the reading is easy. 
"Bombing and Strategy" Dickens ( 1946) 
In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes 
British aerial strategy (particularly strategic bomb­
ing) of World War-II. Concerned primarily with the 
integration of bombing and other military and naval 
efforts as they affect the British Isles, it contains 
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gards the employment of air power in a balanced 
fleet. 
PP 
"The Bismarck Episode" Grenfell ( 1948) 219 
A detailed account of the chase and sinking of the 
German battleship Bismarck. 
"Summary Reports, European and Pacific Wars" 
U.S.S.B.S. (1945-46) 50 
In two parts., A concise report of the results obtained 
by strat�gic bombing in the European and Pacific 
Theaters including conclusions, lessons learned and 
future trends. 
"The Role of Sea Power in Global Warfare of the Future" 
(Brassey's Naval Annual, 1947) Rosinski 14 
A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the 
thesis that sea power will continue to be a fundamental 
and decisive historical force. 
III. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION
"The Art of War." Sun Tzu 99 
46 
This is a 1944 edition of the Giles translation of one of 
the greatest military classics ever written. The book 
comprises thirteen short chapters. In the first. par-
. agraph Sun Tzu writes" The art of war is of vital im­
portance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, 
a road either to safety or ruin. Hence it is a subject 
of inquiry-which can on no account be neglected". 
From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of 
the principles of war, and to an examination of 
them. This is a book that should be read by every 
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pp 
officer and would be a valuable addition to his personal 
library. 
"Makers of Modem Strategy" (Selections) Earle (1944) 
This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military 
affairs which was conducted at the Institute for Ad­
vanced Study. Twenty well known historians trace 
the development of modern military thought in brief, 
and in some casEls brilliant, studies of the contri­
butions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Doubet, and 
Foch (among others) to current military thinking. 
"Generals and Generalship" Wavell ( 1943) 
The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities 
he must have to handle his troops, and his relationship 
with the statesmen who command his activities are 
ably presented by Field Marshall Wavell in this book. 
"Organization, A Formul-ation of Principle" Brown ( 1945) 
A treatise on the basic principles of organization. 
IV. ATOMIC ENERGY
"Fear, War and the Bomb" Blackett ( 1948) 
Professor Blackett first analyzes air power in the last 
war, then the atom bomb as a weapon. With these two 
studies as a premise, he proceeds to discuss the bomb's 
strategic consequences. The author's background a1;1 an 
atomic scientist, a former member of Great Britian's 
Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, and as a 
military man, plug the carefully chosen quotations 
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of the book convincing. The second half of the work 
is devoted to the political implications of the bomb, 
and here the author displays so much bias that one 
naturally questions the conclusions drawn in the first 
half. The book is so controversial that it probably will 
be widely i:-ead. 
'Must We Hide?" Lapp (1949) 
A short discussion of the results of the first five 
A-bomb bursts. Dr. Lapp, Executive Director of the 
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and De­
velopment Board, develops the capabilities of the bomb 
and demonstrates these capabilities by relating the 
various types of bursts to the damage each would 
produce in an American city. 
PP 
182 
''The,Efjects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" 
U .S.S.B.S. (1946) 43 
A condensed but complete report on the effects of the 
two bombs. 
V. MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS
,,United States and China'' Fairbank ( 1949) 
John King Fairbank is well qualified to write in the 
field he deals with in this book. He has lived for a 
number of years in China and traveled extensively 
there. He is at present in charge of the China Program 
at Harvard, Professor Fairbank states that his pur-
. pose is "to indicate some of the major currents which 
now form the tide of social change in China" and "to 
summarize the major patterns of thought and conduct, 
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PP 
grained in Chinese society. This purpose he accom­
plishes admirably. The book should be · read by any 
officer who wishes to straighten out his thinking on the 
subject of our position in China, for in it Fairbank 
manages to separate the wheat from the chaff, and 
to present a reasoned, coherent picture· of the forces 
that make China what it is. 
uHow New will the.Better World be?" Becker (194) 
A stimulating discussion of the post-war reconstruc­
tion period. The author diagnoses the present state of 
the world, with special attention to nationalism, sov­
ereignty, power politics, and imperialism. 
"How lo Think Straight" Thouless ( 1939) 
In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor 
Thouless discusses the most effective ways of achiev­
ing and maintaining a clear thinking, well-balanced 
and flexible mind. 
'
1The Ari of Plain Talk" Flesch ( 1946) 
A book that tells how to talk plain. People whose bus­
iness or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable 
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This section lists material published in current periodicals 
which will be of interest and value to officers of the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Coast Guard. 
"Strategy of Limited War" 
By Ascoli, Schreiber, Deutscher & Hessler. The Reporter. 
August 1.. 
"America Today; A Freehand Sketch" 
By Lewis Galantiere. Foreign Affairs. July. 
"Piercing the Iron Curtain" 
By Lowell M. Clucas. The Yale Review. Summer 1950. 
"Atomic Weapons and the Korean War" 
Editorial Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July. 
"The Great Results of Korea" 
By Ernest K. Lindley. Newsweek. August 7. 
"Exaggerated Dangers of Germ Warf are" 
American Mercury. July. 
''American Policy Toward Russia" 
By Quincy Wright. World Politics., July. 
"The Strategy of World War Ill" 
By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller and Alexander Mebane. 
American Perspective. Summer, 1950. 
11 Geurrilla" 
Parts I and II, by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II Marine 
Corps Gazette, July and August. 
"We're Betting our Shirts on the Atomic Submarine." 
50 
By Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood. Saturday 
Evening Post of 22 July. 
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"Sofliet WM Potffllial is Rising" 
U. S. News and World Report. July 14, 1950. 
"Russu, Today: lls Strength, lls Weakness, Its AbilitJ to W 11ge W 111' 
11gllimt the United Stllles" 
By Richard Wilson. Look. August 15, 1950. 
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